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ABSTRACT 
Recent studies of the relationship between parenting and child 
development have included a focus on the parent’s capacity to treat the child 
as a psychological agent. Several constructs have been developed to refer to 
this capacity, for example maternal mind-mindedness, reflective functioning 
and parental mentalizing. In this review article, we compare and contrast 
different constructs from diverse theoretical backgrounds that have been 
developed to operationalize parental mentalizing.  We examine the empirical 
evidence to date in support of each of the constructs, and review the relevant 
measures associated with each construct. Next, we discuss the possibility that 
these apparently diverse constructs may tap into the same underlying 
neurobiological socio-cognitive system. We conclude by proposing a testable 
model for describing the links between parental mentalization, the 
development of mentalizing in children, and child psychopathology.  
 3 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of parenting practices for children’s psychosocial adjustment 
has been an undisputed tenet of developmental psychology (Gottman, Katz, & 
Hooven, 1996). Whereas work in this area has typically focused on practices 
for obtaining and maintaining discipline, a shift has occurred in the last 10 
years to include a focus on parents’ capacity to treat the child as a 
psychological agent. A psychological agent can be defined as a system which 
can reason about either their own or other people’s explicit goals, intentions, 
and beliefs (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1993; Davies, 1994; 
Perner, 1991). 
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This shift was partly motivated by a problem in attachment research 
that until recently had remained unresolved. Ever since Bowlby’s  (1973, 
1980a, 1980b) seminal work suggested that attachment security is transmitted 
from one generation to the next, attachment researchers have been struggling 
to formulate the mechanisms responsible for this intergenerational 
transmission. The results of a meta-analysis have shown that maternal 
sensitivity (measured during the Strange Situation procedure and generally 
referring to global positive features like cooperation, acceptance, contingent 
responsiveness and pleasurable affect) accounts for only 23% of the variance 
in the association between maternal attachment representation, as measured 
by the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; George, Kaplan, & Main, 1984), and 
infant attachment (Van Ijzendoorn, 1995). As a consequence, the question of 
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how to account for what Van Ijzenhoorn (1995) terms the ‘transmission gap’ 
has become of crucial importance. Could other aspects of the mother-child 
relationship, apart from maternal responsiveness, account for the 
intergenerational transmission of attachment security? 
An answer to this emerged through the notion of a theory of mind. The 
concept of theory of mind was coined by the primatologists Premack & 
Woodruff (1978), and has since been adapted to developmental psychology 
to refer to the capacity to interpret the behavior of others within a mentalistic 
framework. ‘Mentalistic’ in this sense refers to our capacity to ascribe 
thoughts, feelings, ideas and intentions to ourselves as well as to others, and 
to employ this capacity in order to anticipate and influence our own and 
others’ behavior. Over the last decade, however, the construct of theory of 
mind and its false belief paradigm have been criticised for being too narrow 
(Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). Thus, some authors prefer to use the term 
‘mentalizing’ instead, because it is slightly more general and not limited to 
specific tasks or age groups (O'Connor & Hirsch, 1999).  
Most early work on mentalizing was concerned with investigating the 
age at which normal children pass theory of mind tasks and the theory of mind 
deficits associated with autism (Sharp, 2006). For attachment theorists, 
however, the concept of mentalizing would serve a two-fold purpose. Main 
(1991) suggests that children’s early experiences with their caregivers are 
important for their subsequent metacognitive knowledge and the monitoring of 
attachment experiences. She suggests that experiences with parents may not 
only alter the contents of the child’s mind, but also the ability to operate upon 
these contents. For attachment theorists, mentalizing thus becomes the 
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mechanism by which (1) the mother-child relationship exerts its influence on 
the attachment security of the child, and (2) the mother-child relationship 
influences the child’s socio-cognitive development. Taken together, 
mentalizing is thought to play a central role in the process by which 
attachment security is passed on from parent to child: secure attachment is 
fostered through accurate and appropriate parental mentalizing of the child, 
which in turn positively stimulates the development of the mentalizing capacity 
in the child.  As a result, the mentalizing child is able to form a secure 
attachment to the parent. However, attachment theorists acknowledge that 
attachment security in the child is not the result of parental behavior alone. 
The parent’s capacity to engage in accurate and appropriate mentalizing may 
be disrupted by a variety of child characteristics, most notably temperament 
[refs?]. The process by which secure attachment is fostered via accurate and 
appropriate parental mentalizing is therefore likely to be bi-directional. 
A review and integration of the constructs purporting to measure 
parental mentalization has been lacking. Several constructs from diverse 
theoretical backgrounds have been suggested, but there is some confusion as 
to where they overlap and differ, and which measures are employed to tap 
into each of these constructs. In fact, because no  
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single review article has synthesized the literature, it is difficult to capture the 
essential underlying elements shared by the constructs. In the present review 
article, we compare and contrast different constructs from diverse theoretical 
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backgrounds that have been developed to operationalize parental 
mentalizing.  We examine the empirical evidence thus far accumulated in 
support of each of the constructs. In so doing, we review the relevant 
measures associated with each construct. Next, we discuss the possibility that 
these apparently diverse constructs may all tap into the same underlying 
neurobiological socio-cognitive system. In short, we suggest that poor 
parental mentalization may play a role in the development of psychopathology 
in the child by altering precisely this underlying neurobiological socio-cognitive 
system. We conclude by proposing a testable model for describing the links 
between parental mentalization, the development of mentalizing in children, 
and child psychopathology. In this way, we hope to contribute to an already 
rich developmental literature on the links between attachment and theory of 
mind, literature that has, by and large, ignored the implications of these links 
for developmental psychopathology outcomes.  
  
Reflective function: parental mentalization through attachment 
representation 
Early research in mentalizing neglected social context as a possible 
factor for explaining individual differences in children’s capacity to mindread. 
From a psychoanalytic framework, Fonagy and co-workers noticed this, and, 
in an early paper, Fonagy (1991) notes: “I would like to argue that 
fundamental to the acquisition of these [mentalizing] capacities is a degree of 
consistency and safety in early object relationships and ‘good enough’ psychic 
functioning in the parents to empower the process of internalization” (p. 642).   
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The first clues to indicate that there might be substance behind this 
suggestion came from mainstream developmental psychology research in the 
late 1980s and 1990s. Findings showed that children’s social-cognitive 
development does not occur in a vacuum, but is embedded within intimate 
family interactions (Dunn, 1988, 1993; Dunn, 1994; Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 
1991; Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991; Perner, 
Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994). The fact that family interactions were shown to 
play a role in the development of mentalizing suggested that attachment 
security may be an important longitudinal, but also a concurrent predictor, of 
mentalizing development.  
One of the first studies to explore this was carried out by Fonagy, 
Steele, Moran, Steele, and Higgitt (1991). In their study, AAI interviews 
(George, Kaplan, & Main, 1984) were conducted with 100 first-time mothers 
and 100 first-time fathers before the birth of their child. AAI responses were 
coded for the frequency of parents’ references to mental states in their 
descriptions of childhood relationships. The families were followed up at 12 
and 18 months after the babies’ birth, during which the Strange Situation 
procedure (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) was administered. 
The findings of the study demonstrated that mentalizing, as measured 
by the frequency of parents’ references to mental states in their accounts of 
their own childhood during the administration of a prenatal AAI, predicted the 
likelihood of their children being securely attached at follow-up, even when 
controlling for verbal IQ. Moreover, when children were followed up at age 
5½, security of attachment in infancy predicted performance on a cognitive-
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emotion task (Harris, 1989). Taken together, these longitudinal findings link all 
the axes of the mediational model for the role of  
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mentalizing, including prenatal AAI classification, parental mentalizing, 
parent-infant attachment and child mentalizing capacity (Fonagy, Steele, 
Steele, & Holder, 1997).  
These links are furthermore supported by studies investigating the 
concurrent relationship between attachment security and mentalizing 
capacity. In preschool children Fonagy, Redfern, & Charman (1997) have 
shown that security of attachment, as measured by the Separation Anxiety 
Test, is a significant predictor of false-belief reasoning, even when verbal 
mental age, social maturity and chronological age are controlled for.  
The above findings suggest that family relations are important for 
mentalizing and that mentalizing is important for the development of 
attachment security as well as for the sociocognitive development of the child. 
But what exactly does mentalizing mean within this context? Slade (2005), 
writing from a psychoanalytic perspective, summarizes the concept as 
referring to both a cognitive process, akin to psychological insight or 
perspective-taking, and an emotional process, that is, the capacity to hold, 
regulate and fully experience one’s own and others’ emotions in a non-
defensive way without becoming overwhelmed or shutting down. When this 
capacity is operationalized within the context of attachment relationships, 
Fonagy refers to it as ‘reflective functioning’ (RF). 
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The most detailed explication of RF can be found in Fonagy, Gergely, 
Jurist, & Target (2002). The term is used to describe the parent’s capacity to 
reflect upon his/her own or the child’s internal mental experience within the 
context of attachment style. It is operationalized through two different 
measurement constructs. 
The first, called adult RF, was developed more than a decade ago 
(Fonagy, Steele, Moran,, et al, 1991; Fonagy, Steele, & Steele, 1991) in the 
analysis of AAI interviews where instances of mentalization were observed 
during adult narratives of childhood. This led to the development of an RF 
scale (Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998). The RF scale assesses 
adults’ capacity to reflect upon memorialized childhood relationships with their 
parents in mentalistic terms. As such, the scale is used to assess responses 
to questions on the AAI that demand reflection or consideration of complex 
unobservable mental states, such as, ‘Why do you think your parents 
behaved the way they did?’ If, during responses to these questions, adults 
demonstrate (1) awareness of the nature of mental states, (2) explicit effort to 
tease out mental states underlying behaviour, and (3) the recognition of the 
developmental aspects of mental states and mental states in relation to the 
interviewer, the adult is rated as high on the RF scale.  Adult RF is thus an 
overt manifestation, in narrative, of an individual’s mentalizing capacity 
(Slade, 2005).  The potential of adult RF as a mechanism for bridging the 
transmission gap became apparent in a study in which high scorers on the 
adult RF scale were shown to fall within an autonomous AAI classification 
(Fonagy, Steele, Moran,, et al, 1991). In addition, high prenatal RF predicted 
secure parent-infant attachment for both mothers and fathers. In fact, when 
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RF was controlled for, AAI classifications no longer predicted parent-infant 
attachment security. 
Recently, published data has introduced a second index of RF – this 
time measuring reflective processes within the context of the parent-child 
relationship as they manifest in parental descriptions of the ongoing, current, 
and evolving relationship to the child (Slade, 2005). This was motivated by the 
assumption that a direct evaluation of the parent’s capacity to reflect on the 
child’s experience would provide a more direct assessment of the phenomena 
proposed to underlie the intergenerational transmission of attachment 
security. 
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To this end, the Parent Development Interview (PDI; Aber, Slade, 
Berger, Bresgi, & Kaplan, 1985; Slade, Bernbach, Grienenberger, Levy, & 
Locker, 2004) was used. The PDI is a 45-item semi-structured clinical 
interview intended to examine parents’ representations of their children, of 
themselves as parents, and of their relationships with their children. The 
measure uses many of the questions in the AAI (e.g. ‘Choose three adjectives 
to describe the relationship with your child‘) and is believed to tap into parents’ 
representations of their children. In addition, it provides an assessment of how 
well parents understand their child’s behaviour, thoughts and feelings (e.g. 
‘Describe a time in the last week when you and your child really clicked’). 
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Several studies have investigated the validity of the PDI. Slade, Belsky, 
Aber, & Phelps (1999) demonstrated construct and predictive validity for the 
PDI by showing that parental representations of the child were related to 
parental representations of attachment and parenting behaviour. Convergent 
and predictive validity were demonstrated in a study showing that PDI 
representations correlated with both adult (measured during pregnancy) and 
infant attachment (measured at 14 months). Aber, Belsky, Slade, and Crnic 
(1999) demonstrated stability in aspects of parents’ representations over a 
follow-up period. Parental representations were also shown to predict 
children’s play behaviour at follow-up (Hartmann, 1998). The PDI  furthermore 
displayed differential correlates for parent and child behaviour between 
families in which early adoption and late adoption took place (Steele, 2003). In 
addition, Grienenberger, Kelly, and Slade (2005) showed that when the PDI is 
coded using the RF scale (PDI-RF), low parental RF correlated with disrupted 
maternal behaviour during the Strange Situation as measured by the Atypical 
Maternal Behavior Instrument for Assessment and Classification (AMBIANCE; 
Bronfman, Parsons, & Lyons-Ruth, 1999). 
Recently, three levels of parental PDI-RF have been described (Slade, 
et al, 2004). Low RF is indicated when a parent seems oblivious to the fact 
that the child has feelings or thoughts which are particularly personal to the 
child, in combination with a denial of the parent’s own experience of 
parenting. Moderate RF is signified if the parent recognises that the child has 
mental states, but their responses still lack reflection on their own mental 
states and the recognition that the child’s mental states or their own mental 
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states are connected to behaviour. Only when such recognition and reflection 
take place, can the parent be rated as high on the parental RF scale.  
Slade (2005; p. 279) provides an example of a highly reflective mother: 
“Sometimes she gets frustrated and angry (child mental state) in ways that I’m 
not sure I understand (opacity of child’s mental state). She points to one thing 
and I hand it to her, but it turns out that’s not really what she wanted (opacity). 
It feels very confusing to me (mother’s mental state) when I’m not sure how 
she’s feeling (opacity of child’s mental state) especially when she’s upset. 
Sometimes she’ll want to do something and I won’t let her because it’s 
dangerous, and so she’ll get angry (mother recognizes diversity of mother and 
child mental states). I may try to pick her up and she obviously didn’t want to 
be picked up because she’s in the middle of being angry (mother recognizes 
dynamic nature of child’s affect) and I interrupted her. In those moments it’s 
me who has the need to pick her up and make her feel better, so I’ll put her 
back down (mother recognizes that her need is triggering a behaviour that is 
not in line with the child’s needs, and changes her behaviour accordingly).” 
Fonagy et al (2002) believe that it is through the latter kind of parental 
mentalization that mentalizing capacity, autonomy and self-regulation are 
fostered in the child.  
It should be noted, however, that parental mentalization is not the only 
variable seen as affecting child attachment security and consequent socio-
cognitive development.  
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Some children have characteristics that make them more likely than 
others to elicit positive or negative emotions from parents (Dix, 1991). The 
parent’s capacity to treat the child as a psychological agent may be 
influenced, for instance, by a ‘difficult’ child temperament. Since the seminal 
work of Thomas and Chess (see Thomas, Chess, & Birch, 1968), there has 
been an explosion of research testifying to the role of child temperament in 
parenting behavior. This literature has clearly pointed to the fact that most 
aspects of child development, including attachment style and socio-cognitive 
development, should be understood in the context of a child's temperament 
and the style of parenting that temperament engenders.  
An augmented hypothesis to the one put forward by Fonagy and co-
workers would therefore be one in which the child’s difficult temperament 
disrupts or curtails parental mentalizing. Indeed, in a later section of this 
review, we will discuss the work of Gottman and colleagues (e.g. Katz & 
Gottman, 1997), who have prospectively demonstrated the role of child 
characteristics in the psychosocial development of the child. Fonagy and co-
workers do not deny the importance of child temperament. However, they 
justify the primacy of parental mentalizing on the basis of their longitudinal 
findings, which demonstrate that prenatal adult RF is predictive of subsequent 
attachment security of the infant and of the mentalizing capacity of the same 
children during the preschool years (Fonagy, Steele, Moran, et al, 1991).  
These findings have recently been replicated by Arnott and Meins (in press) 
and will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
In summary, we can conclude that the concept of RF, which is rooted 
in the psychoanalytic tradition, refers to mentalization measured in the context 
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of attachment (Fonagy & Target, 2005). As such, measuring RF involves 
coding the level of mentalization against the background of individuals’ 
representations of their attachment relationships. Mentalization in this context 
therefore takes place ‘off-line’ and is thought to tap into a parent’s 
predominant stance towards the child as a more or less intentional being, 
perhaps reflecting multiple interactions over time. Two types of RF have been 
operationalized: (1) adult RF as measured by the RF scale (Fonagy,, et al, 
1998) and (2) parental RF as indexed by the application of the RF scale to 
PDI ratings (Slade,, et al, 2004).  
 
Maternal mind-mindedness: parental mentalization during parent-child 
interaction 
Arguing from a cognitive developmental point of view, Meins (1997) 
reframes attachment theory within a Vygotskian approach and introduces the 
concept of maternal mind-mindedness (MMM) as a mechanism for bridging 
the transmission gap of attachment security across generations. She built her 
argument across several empirical studies (Meins, 1997; Meins, Fernyhough, 
Russell, & Clark-Carter, 1998; Meins & Russell, 1997) by first demonstrating 
an association between secure child attachment and three things: (1) 
referential tendencies in infant language acquisition, (2) perspective-taking 
during pretend play, and (3) mentalizing capacity as evidenced by passing a 
theory of mind task at age four. In addition, mothers of securely attached 
children presented their children with information and instructions that were 
comprehensible and pitched within the child’s zone of proximal development. 
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Such mothers also used speech that contained more mental state terms when 
describing their children. 
These findings provided the necessary evidence to suggest that 
children of mothers who are mind-minded, that is, who treat their children as 
individuals with minds, are  
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more likely to be securely attached. For Meins (1997), mind-
mindedness entails more than just treating an infant as an intentional agent. 
The latter implies that the mother acknowledges that her infant is capable of 
expressing a desire through a particular mode of communication. Treating 
one’s child as a mental agent, however, implies a further understanding that 
the child is capable of having representations of the world and different 
stances or perspectives that may be taken towards reality (Meins, 1997). 
Meins then sees this capacity as the crucial ingredient of the maternal 
sensitivity that fosters secure attachment in the infant. In addition, like Fonagy 
and colleagues (e.g. Fonagy,, et al, 2002), Meins argues that MMM may also 
facilitate in a child a greater understanding of his/her own mind and of others 
as mental agents, thus increasing the child’s experience of self-efficacy 
(Meins, 1997), that is, its ability to regulate its own behavior and emotions. 
[self-efficacy is a new term here – maybe it needs an explanation (to a lay-
person like this reader)?]. 
The mere demonstration of a link between MMM and secure child 
attachment does not necessarily imply that MMM alone provides secure 
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attachment. Fonagy and Meins are yet to measure child temperament in 
relation to MMM. It is, of course, quite possible that child temperament may 
interact with MMM in predicting the quality of attachment.  
A measure of MMM repeatedly used in Meins’s studies was developed 
based on the question “Can you describe [child’s name] for me?” (Meins & 
Fernyhough, 1999; Meins,, et al, 1998). Responses are coded in various 
ways. Firstly, there is a mental response: any reference to the child’s mental 
life, in terms of his/her will, mind, intellect, metacognition, imagination; any 
comments relating to desires, wishes, and emotion. This category does not 
include references that are merely comments on the child’s likes and dislikes 
or behavioral tendencies. Secondly, there is a behavioral response: any 
reference to behavior, such as games and activities enjoyed by the child or 
interactions with others on a behavioral level. Other descriptions included in 
this category are words like “lively, talkative, boisterous, aggressive, passive, 
friendly, restrained, outgoing, naughty.” Third, there is a physical response: 
any physical attributes, the child’s age, and descriptions relating to the child’s 
position in the family. Fourth, a general response: any description that does 
not fit into the above categories. Scores are then calculated to define the 
proportion of mentalistic terms used by the mother compared to the total 
number of coded descriptions.  
Whilst it could be argued that the above measure of MMM reflects off-
line mentalizing, and is thus in some ways similar to parental RF described 
above, Meins and colleagues have also developed a more on-line 
measurement of MMM. In this measurement, 20 minutes of free play between 
mothers and their 6-month old babies were videotaped and coded for five 
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categories: (1) maternal responsiveness to change in the infant’s direction of 
gaze; (2) maternal responsiveness to the infant’s object-directed action; (3) 
imitation; (4) encouragement of autonomy; and (5) appropriate mind-related 
comments. In a series of studies, the significance of category five (appropriate 
mind-related comments) for attachment security and the socio-cognitive 
development of the child was demonstrated. Appropriate maternal mind-
related comments were concurrently predictive of attachment security at 6 
months (Meins,, et al, 2001). Appropriate MMM during infancy was 
furthermore shown to be longitudinally predictive of attachment security at 45 
and 48 months (Meins, et al, 2002), and of social-cognitive performance at 55 
months (Meins, et al, 2003).  
This empirical work has provided important information on the MMM-
attachment-mentalizing link, which goes some way to explaining the 
intergenerational transmission of attachment. To complete the explanation, it 
is necessary to demonstrate that prenatal AAI classification is associated with 
MMM, which in turn associates with child attachment and mentalizing. Work to 
this effect has just been completed (Arnott & Meins, in press)in which prenatal 
autonomous parental AAI classification, higher RF, and  
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infant–parent attachment security are shown to be associated with 
greater parental mind-mindedness. 
The major contribution of this work lies in its ability to demonstrate that 
prenatal AAI classification relates to on-line, real life post-natal interactions 
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between parent and child. It furthermore confirms the relationship between 
AAI and off-line representations provided by adult and parent measures of 
RF, which had previously been demonstrated by Fonagy, Steele, Moran,, et al 
(1991), but remained unreplicated until now. Bernier and Dozier (2003) tested 
the relationship between AAI and on-line MMM by measuring MMM as 
described by Meins,, et al (1998) in 6-30-month old foster children. They 
found that high MMM related to non-autonomous classifications in adults and 
insecure attachment relationships with children. This surprising finding may be 
reflective of the fact that the coding scheme employed by Meins,, et al (1998) 
was developed to be appropriate for slightly older children. It might also be the 
case that MMM functions differently for foster dyads compared to biological 
dyads. For instance, it is possible that in this special population, child 
characteristics and the bi-directional nature of the relationship between 
attachment security and parental mentalizing is more salient compared to 
biological dyads. [say something about why this might be so?] 
In summary, MMM is related to RF in as much as both consider the 
mother’s capacity to treat the child as a psychological agent. They differ in 
operationalization in that MMM involves the evaluation of observed on-line, 
real-life interactions between parent-child dyads. Both concepts therefore 
provide a unique, but related perspective on the capacity to treat the child as 
a psychological agent. It may be argued that both concepts share a common 
underlying neurobiology, with MMM expressing itself in real-life interaction 
with the child, and RF expressing itself through the metacognitive 
representations that the mother holds about the relationship with the child. 
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We will return to the question of underlying neurobiology by providing 
evidence in support of this notion in the last section of this review article. First, 
we consider other operationalizations of parental mentalization within 
frameworks that are not explicitly concerned with attachment.   
 
Parental meta-emotion philosophy: parental mentalization of emotion 
and emotion coaching 
The concept of parental meta-emotion philosophy (PMEP) was 
developed in the context of marriage and family psychology (Gottman,, et al, 
1996). Gottman and his colleagues identify a need in the parenting literature 
to include emotion in the analyses of parenting behaviors. Two areas of 
research have influenced the development of the notion of PMEP. The first is 
the emotion-processing research of Ekman and co-workers (e.g. Ekman, 
Friesen, & Simons, 1985), which suggests great variability in the emotional 
responses (‘meta-emotions’) to expressed emotions. The second is the 
concept of ‘metacognition’, which also lies at the basis of the theory of mind 
literature (e.g. Flavell, 1979; Fodor, 1992; Olson & Astington, 1993). Against 
this background, the concept of PMEP was developed to capture the notion of 
metacognition about emotion. More specifically, PMEP refers to an organized 
set of feelings and thoughts about one’s own emotions and one’s children’s 
emotions.  
Gottman and co-workers suggest that the optimal meta-emotion 
philosophy in terms of preschool children’s psychosocial adjustment is that of 
an emotion-coaching  
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philosophy. Such a philosophy (as opposed to an emotion-dismissing 
or ‘laissez-faire’ philosophy) has five components: (1) parents are aware of 
low-intensity emotions in themselves and in their children; (2) they view the 
child’s negative emotion as an opportunity for intimacy or teaching; (3) they 
validate their child’s emotion; (4) they assist the child in verbally labelling 
his/her emotions and (5) they problem-solve with the child, setting behavioral 
limits and discussing goals and strategies for dealing with the situation that 
led to the negative emotion. Gottman and colleagues hypothesize that 
children learn better to regulate their emotions through the parents’ ability to 
‘manoeuvre in the world of emotions’ (p. 244). 
The overlap with Fonagy’s concept of RF and Meins’s concept of MMM 
is clear. Both share a philosophical basis in the notion of ‘meta’-processing of 
cognitions or emotions. At the core of Gottman’s concept of PMEP lies the 
notion of self- and other-reflection in mentalistic terms, specifically during 
highly-charged emotional experiences. Fonagy,, et al (2002) refer to this 
capacity as RF, and give similar weight to reflecting on emotions and 
cognitions. Moreover, the concept of PMEP overlaps with RF and MMM in 
that they are seen as the mechanisms by which the parent helps the child to 
learn emotion regulation. Although evaluations of MMM or RF do not explicitly 
measure emotion regulation, it is implied by both RF and MMM theories. For 
Fonagy and co-workers, it is through the primary caregiver’s capacity to 
mentalize that infants learn to regulate their own behaviour and emotions 
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(Fonagy, et al, 2002; Fonagy, 1997). Meins refers to this as self-efficacy 
(Meins, 1997) [should be explained earlier when self-efficacy is first 
mentioned on p14]. Gottman and colleagues make this explicit by taking into 
account emotion regulation in their measurement of parents’ mentalizing  of 
the child’s emotions. 
To measure PMEP, the authors developed the Meta-Emotion Interview 
(Katz & Gottman, 1986). This interview includes questions about parents’ own 
experience of emotion in addition to their feelings, attitudes and behavior with 
regard to their children’s emotions. Responses are then audio-taped and 
coded using a checklist rating system called the Meta-Emotion Coding 
System (Katz, Mitmann, & Hooven, 1994). Coding yields three codes per 
emotion (sadness, anger, and fear): (1) mother’s awareness of her own 
emotion, (2) mother’s awareness of her child’s emotion, and (3) mother’s 
coaching of child emotion. 
Whilst Gottman and colleagues are not concerned with using PMEP to 
bridge the transmission gap, their work extends the work on MMM and RF by 
explicitly measuring the parent’s coaching of emotion-regulation strategies 
alongside the acknowledgement that the child is a psychological agent – that 
is, an individual with a mind containing feelings, thoughts, and intentions. It 
also extends RF/MMM work through a series of longitudinal studies that 
investigate the implications of the PMEP for the emotional well-being of 
children (Gottman,, et al, 1996; Katz & Windecker-Nelson, 2004). Findings 
demonstrate that children whose parents engage in more emotion-coaching 
show less evidence of physiological stress, greater physiological regulatory 
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abilities, greater ability to focus attention, less physical illness, higher 
academic achievement, and better peer relations (Gottman,, et al, 1996).  
In another study, Katz & Gottman (1997) examined several protective 
mechanisms that may reduce deleterious correlates of marital conflict and 
marital dissolution in young children. These included more traditional parent-
child interactions (parental warmth, parental scaffolding/praise, and inhibition 
of parental rejection) as well as PMEP. In acknowledging that both child and 
parent characteristics play a role in child development, they also included a 
third set of potential buffers: the intra-individual characteristics of the child, 
including the child's intelligence and measures of  
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regulatory physiology (basal vagal tone and vagal suppression). Fifty-
six families with a preschool child were assessed when the children were 5 
years old, and followed up when the children were 8 years old. Follow-up 
outcomes included observations of peer interaction, ratings of behavior 
problems, peer aggression, child physical illness, and achievement. The study 
shows that PMEP is as good a buffer as traditional parenting variables and 
child characteristics in protecting children against the adverse effects of 
marital conflict and dissolution. 
In yet another study, Gottman and colleagues have demonstrated that 
mothers of children with conduct problems are less aware of their own 
emotions and engaged in less emotion-coaching of their children’s emotions 
than mothers of children without conduct problems (Katz & Windecker-
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Nelson, 2004). For both aggressive and nonaggressive children, higher levels 
of mother awareness and coaching of emotion are associated with more 
positive and less negative peer play. These data suggest that both aggressive 
and non-aggressive children can benefit when parents are more aware and 
coaching of emotion. 
In summary, Gottman’s contribution is important for several reasons: 
(1) it highlights the importance of emotion in parental mentalizing by explicitly 
focusing on the parent’s capacity to recognize emotions in themselves and 
their children; (2) it empirically links parental mentalizing to the child’s capacity 
to regulate his/her own emotions; (3) it extends previous research by 
empirically demonstrating the importance of parental mentalizing for 
developmental psychopathology outcomes in the child; and (4) it testifies to 
the importance of child characteristics that affect the child’s psychosocial 
development in concert with parental mentalization.  
 
Parents’ cognitions about their children’s intentions and attributions: 
the accuracy of parental mentalizing  
 In keeping with Gottman and colleagues’ endeavors to demonstrate the 
implications of parental mentalization for child psychosocial outcome and child 
socio-cognitive development, Sharp, Fonagy & Goodyer (2006) developed a 
paradigm for investigating the accuracy of parental mentalizing. Arguing from 
the perspective of a developmental psychopathology framework, they asked 
mothers to guess the responses of their 7-11-year old children, who in turn, 
were asked to attribute thoughts to their peers in fictitious distressing peer-
related scenarios. By comparing children’s actual thoughts with their mothers’ 
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attributions about their children’s thoughts, a continuous measure of maternal 
accuracy in mentalization could be derived. 
Results suggested that maternal accuracy was normally distributed 
with mothers accurately guessing the responses of their children for about half 
of the social scenarios. Mothers were furthermore shown to be significantly 
above chance in the accuracy with which they predicted their children's overall 
attributional styles. Poor maternal accuracy was shown to be associated with 
ineffective social-cognitive reasoning in the child during peer-related 
scenarios. Maternal accuracy was found to be related to child psychosocial 
adjustment (reduced scores on child psychopathology measures from multiple 
sources). Importantly, when the maternal accuracy variable was transformed 
to derive three groups (low, average, and high maternal accuracy), no 
significant differences were found between the average and high maternal 
accuracy groups for child psychosocial adjustment. In line with the concept of 
‘good enough parenting’ (originally coined by Winnicott, 1965), good enough 
parental mentalizing seems to be all that is needed.  
 
[Page 747 ] 
 
Sharp, et al’s (2006) study extends RF/MMM work by demonstrating 
the implications of parental mentalization for symptoms of psychopathology. It 
also introduces a method for tapping into parental mentalizing of older, middle 
school-aged children. Although the study was not designed to directly test the 
intergenerational transmission of poor mentalizing skill, the finding that low 
maternal accuracy is associated with ineffective attributional processes in the 
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child speaks to the possibility that poor mentalizing in the mother (low 
maternal accuracy) may carry over so that ineffective mentalizing is facilitated 
in the child. 
Of course, it is acknowledged that many other factors affect the 
development of a child’s mentalizing capacity. For instance, Perner, Ruffman, 
and Leekam (1994) demonstrated accelerated theory of mind development in 
children with older siblings. It should also be recognized that correlational data 
cannot be taken to infer causality. It is nevertheless worthwhile considering 
the importance of parental mentalizing capacity in concert with other factors in 
the psychosocial development of the child.  
In further support of the importance of accurate parental mentalizing, 
other studies of developmental psychopathology have shown that mothers of 
aggressive children attribute their children’s misbehaviour and 
unresponsiveness to noncompliant, defiant, and hostile intent (Dix & 
Lochman, 1990; MacKinnon-Lewis, Lamb, Arbuckle, Baradaran, & Volling, 
1992; Smith & O'Leary, 1995; Strassberg, 1995, 1997). Strassberg (1997), for 
instance, showed vignettes to mothers of aggressive vs. non-aggressive 
children. The vignettes reflected different forms of child non-compliance, each 
varying in severity of non-compliance. As predicted, mothers of aggressive 
children ascribed hostile intent to children on all forms of non-compliance and 
not only the severe conditions, whilst average mothers attributed hostile intent 
only to the most severe conditions.  
According to Strassberg (1997), an important question for the 
interpretation of these results is whether they reflect the mother as an 
accurate appraiser of her child’s intention (a ‘child effect’). It is certainly 
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reasonable to argue that aggressive boys do in fact display more hostile intent 
compared with ‘average’ boys. The alternative account is that the underlying 
process may be ascribed to a predisposition to negative attributions of 
intentions (a ‘mother effect’), in which case mothers may be maintaining or 
even causing aggressive behavior. Strassberg (1997; p.214) opts for the 
latter: “It is patently irrational to interpret mild non-compliance (such as 
affectively benign requests for permission or well-mannered statement of 
preference) as representing hostile and coercive intentions. The notion that 
the child’s benign (even nice) behaviour is intended to force the mother into 
capitulation is a logical inconsistency on the mother’s part.” This ‘hostile 
attribution bias’ on the part of the mother has furthermore been explained as a 
better predictor of aggression in children compared with the mother’s 
judgement of the severity of non-compliance.  
Taken together, the above research suggests that although the mother 
may be mentalizing her child, she is doing so incorrectly. Thus, a 
‘misinterpretation’ or ‘misreading’ of the child’s mind takes place, akin to what 
Meins, et al (2001; 2002) refer to as ‘inappropriate MMM’ or what Sharp 
(2006) referred to as ‘distorted mentalizing’. It furthermore confirms the link 
between the misreading of children’s intentions and attributions, and the 
child’s socio-cognitive reasoning and psychosocial adjustment. 
Distorted parental mentalization may, however, have implications for 
the parent’s own emotions as well. How upset parents become with children 
who misbehave depends on inferences parents make about children’s 
intentions (Dix & Cusec, 1985). Mothers have been found to be more upset 
when they think that children understand,  
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intend and have control over negative behavior, and that negative acts 
therefore reflect negative personality dispositions in the child (Dix & Lochman, 
1990; Dix & Reinhold, 1991; Dix, Ruble, Crusec, & Nixon, 1986; Dix, Ruble, & 
Zambarano, 1989). Moreover, the tendency to misinterpret children’s 
intentions and thoughts seems to be more apparent in depressive or abusive 
mothers (see Dix, 1991 for a review). 
In summary, distorted parental mentalizing, or the lack thereof, whether 
due to child characteristics or parental pathology or both, seems to be an 
important correlate, if not predictor, of child psychosocial outcome. 
 
Implications for developmental psychopathology 
Several constructs and measures of parental mentalizing have been 
described from diverse theoretical backgrounds – all of them indices of the 
parent’s capacity to treat the child as a psychological agent. Whilst some of 
these constructs have been developed to account for the gap in the 
intergenerational transmission of attachment security (RF and MMM), others 
have been developed to investigate the relationship between parental 
mentalization and the psychosocial and socio-cognitive development of the 
child. Some, like RF, MMM and PMEP, are explicitly concerned with emotion- 
and self-regulation, while others [examples?] are less so. And whilst some 
occur off-line (e.g. RF), others occur on-line in real-time parent-child 
interactions (MMM). What all these indices of parental mentalization have in 
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common, despite different operationalizations, is the fact that they involve 
what we are going to refer to as ‘a meeting of minds’ between parent and 
child. But what makes this meeting of minds possible? We will first approach 
this question from a cognitive science point of view, and then consider the 
neurobiological level of explanation, in order ultimately to formulate an 
argument of how both parental and child mentalization may play a role in the 
development of emotional-behavior disorders of childhood. 
According to Tomasello and colleagues, a meeting of minds is made 
possible by ‘shared’ or ‘we intentionality’ (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, 
& Moll, 2005). They propose that “human beings, and only human beings, are 
biologically adapted for participating in collaborative activities involving shared 
goals and socially co-ordinated action plans (joint intentions)” (p.676). 
However, in addition to the capacity to understand the goals, intentions and 
perceptions of other persons (theory of mind), a meeting of minds requires the 
motivation to share these things in interaction with others (Tomasello,, et al, 
2005). Tomasello and colleagues argue that at the basis of this lies the 
motivation to share emotions with others. It is thus the motivation to share 
emotional states with others that distinguishes us from apes, who despite 
sophistication in understanding many aspects of intentional action, seem to 
lack the motivations and skills for sharing even the most basic forms of 
psychological states with one another. Tomasello et al (2005) conclude that, 
as humans, we are motivated to engage in shared intentionality, because we 
are hardwired to want to be part of a ‘we’. As a species, this enables 
collaboration, which is necessary for our survival [is it? Why? As a social 
animal, I can see that this is true, especially on account of something like a 
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social contract. But as a ‘species’? We need to procreate to survive, but 
surely that is all that is necessary. It’s not an easy job, but single mothers 
living feral could raise children successfully, and these children then similarly 
never really engage with other humans except to procreate; is the 
collaboration of mother-child and sexual partners proof enough? But many, 
many species engage in precisely the same collaborations…  We might 
collaborate more than other species (ants?), but it is not necessary for our 
survival; just helpful for our survival as a social animal…{I think that the notion 
of our being ‘hard-wired’ to be a ‘we’ is also an interesting notion raising a lot 
of questions, but perhaps not here…]. Against this background, parental 
mentalization, which facilitates a meeting of minds between parent and child, 
whether operationalized by RF, MMM, or by any other means, can then be 
seen as a species-typical social interaction early in ontogeny.  
In addition to the above two prerequisites for shared intentionality (the 
capacity to understand intentions and the motivation to share psychological 
states), Gergely and colleagues (Csibra & Gergely, in press; Gergely & 
Csibra, 2005) suggest an ability  
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to communicate relevant information as a third prerequisite: 
“Participants must negotiate and coordinate at all levels of Joint Collaborative 
Activities by means of communicating relevant information” (Gergely & Csibra, 
2005; p. 702). They suggest that because of increasingly sophisticated 
teleofunctional understanding of tools during hominoid evolution, a selective 
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pressure for a new type of cultural learning mechanism was created. This 
learning mechanism ensures the transmission of relevant knowledge by 
making the latter manifest to the observer, which leads to the emergence of 
the specialized communicative system of human ‘pedagogy’. Shared 
intentionality is thus a product of the capacity of the parent to convey accurate 
information, coupled with receptiveness on the part of the child to receive 
relevant knowledge. So, whilst Tomasello and colleagues view the meeting of 
minds as a mere by-product of a species-specific motivation to cooperate and 
share mental states with each other, Gergely and colleagues explain it by 
appealing to a species-unique capacity for cultural learning through the 
communication of relevant knowledge. 
Evidence for the evolutionary basis of a meeting of minds (whether 
through the mechanism of ‘we intentionality’, pedagogy, or both), comes from 
recent neurobiological studies. Neuroimaging data have provided compelling 
evidence that a specific brain system, analogous to those systems already 
identified for spatial navigation and face recognition, is uniquely dedicated to 
our capacity to mentalize (Frith & Frith, 1999). Proof now exists to suggest 
that mentalizing is mediated by a circumscribed network that includes the 
superior temporal sulcus, the medial prefrontal cortex (including the anterior 
cingulate cortex) and, to some extent, the amygdala (Fletcher, et al, 1995; 
Frith & Frith, 2003; Gallagher & Frith, 2003). This is the case for both verbal- 
and cartoon-based theory of mind tasks (Gallagher, et al, 2000).  
Parallel to this work has been research examining the neurobiological 
correlates of social cognition in general, of which the mentalization circuitry 
forms a subsystem. This work has offered a possible reconciliation of 
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biological and psychological approaches to social behaviour (Kyte & Goodyer, 
2005). For instance, Adolphs (2003) concludes that the neural regulation of 
social cognition reflects both innate automatic and cognitively impenetrable 
mechanisms, as well as acquired, contextual and volitional aspects. Adolphs 
(2003) explains that “an acknowledgement of such an architecture simply 
provides detail to the way in which social cognition is complex — it is complex 
because it is not monolithic, but rather it consists of several tracks of 
information processing that can be variously recruited depending on the 
circumstances” (p. 165). 
Taken together, these new developments are suggestive of the 
possibility that social-environmental factors such as MMM (Meins, 1997), RF 
(Fonagy,, et al, 2002), distorted/inaccurate parental mentalizing (Sharp, et al, 
2006; Strassberg, 1997; Dix, 1991), and PMEP (Gottman,, et al, 1996) may 
play a crucial role in the process of hardwiring mentalization circuitries as the 
child matures into a mentalizing agent. Nothing is yet known about the 
development of these brain circuitries in children, but it is conceivable that if 
parental mentalizing processes do not function at an optimal level, this (along 
with other factors not specified in the current model) may have implications for 
the child’s psychosocial functioning. Indeed, in this review, we have reported 
findings to suggest that children of poor mentalizers are at greater risk of 
symptoms of psychopathology (Sharp,, et al, 2006; Gottman, et al, 1996; Katz 
& Windecker-Nelson, 2004; Strassberg, 1997). 
As outlined elsewhere in this review, we do not mean to say that 
parental mentalization is the only vehicle by which child psychopathology 
develops. One can imagine  
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myriad factors that may impact parental mentalization: child 
temperament, parental psychopathology, family structure, life events, genetic 
predispositions, to name but a few. Our model cannot encompass all of these 
factors at once.  It does, however, suggest one pathway by which normal 
development may go awry. That is, when a meeting of minds does not take 
place between parent and child, the child may be at greater risk for the 
development of psychopathology. 
Just how should the pathway by which parental mentalization exerts its 
influence on the development of psychopathology be visualized? The model 
in Figure 1 suggests such a pathway and offers several hypotheses to be 
investigated by future research.  
Figure 1 about here 
Fonagy, Steele, Moran,, et al (1991) have demonstrated the link 
between AAI, RF and attachment security. This compelling finding needs 
further replication beyond the recent one by Arnott and Meins (in press). 
Moreover, the relationship between parental mentalizing (RF or MMM) and 
emotional regulation, suggested by both Fonagy’s and Main’s work, has not 
been empirically tested. Although studies have investigated the link between 
attachment security and psychopathology (Sroufe, Carlson, Levy, & Egeland, 
1999), between parental mentalizing and psychopathology (Strassberg, 1997; 
Sharp,, et al, 2006; Gottman,, et al, 1996), and between psychopathology and 
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emotion regulation (Southam-Gerow & Kendall, 2002), these factors have not 
yet been considered in a longitudinal or concurrent path analysis with 
psychopathology as outcome.  
 
Conclusion 
  In this review article, we have summarized the different constructs and 
the measures that index parental mentalization. We have suggested that 
these constructs, although distinct in the operationalization of parental 
mentalization, all rely on a common and evolutionary-based neurobiological 
mentalization circuitry that, if ‘broken’ in the parent, may lead to reduced 
mentalization capacity in the child, which, in turn, through deficient emotional 
regulation processes, may lead to the development of symptoms of pathology. 
[I am sure that pathology has a more specific meaning here; ‘pathological’ for 
example… But it just seems weird and general to me.] 
Acknowledging the importance of parental mentalizing for the socio-
cognitive and psychosocial development of the child has several practical and 
clinical implications. Recently, mentalization-based treatment programs that 
specifically target the mentalizing capacity of individuals have been developed 
for inpatient care settings (Bateman  
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& Fonagy, 2004), families (Fearon et al, 2006), mother-infant dyads 
(Sadler, Slade, & Mayes, 2006), and schools (Twemlow, Sacco, & Fonagy, 
2001; 2004). By linking the capacity to mentalize to developmental 
 34 
psychopathology outcomes, the urgency of the further development of such 
programs is emphasized. 
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Figure 1. Testable model of factors that relate to parental mentalization and 
suggested pathway for the development of psychopathology through 
mentalization 
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